The authors present operating principles of passive safety systems used in nuclear power plants using the example of the AP1000 plant. In particular, they describe the passive residual heat removal system and the passive containment cooling system. Moreover, the paper presents an analysis of a scenario involving the failure to start of active elements (Diesel generators) in the case of a loss of off-site power. The study presents the role of passive safety systems mentioned above in residual heat removal, as well as their impact on the temperature of the working medium in the cooling circuit and the refuelling water storage tank (IRWST).
Introduction
Reliable heat removal from core after reactor shut-down is becoming a significant problem for various accidents at nuclear power plants currently in operation. As it is commonly known, nuclear decay processes are characterised by certain inertia. Suppression of the chain reaction cannot completely terminate it; element conversions causing them to decay and release heat continue. This causes generation of so-called residual heat, which causes heat generation in a reactor even after it is shut down. Therefore, guarantee of removal of residual heat regardless of the accident type, e.g. coolant pipeline rupture, circulation pump damage or loss of electricity power supply, becomes an essential issue. Obviously, due to the negative temperature reactivity coefficient an explosion of nuclear reactor is not possible; however, failure to remove heat from the core may cause overheating and meltdown. In order to guarantee efficient removal of residual heat and prevent excessive temperature increase in the core of the AP1000 reactor, a Passive Residual Heat Removal System (PRHR) has been developed [1] . It is designed to remove heat from the reactor in situations, when normal heat removal via steam generators would not be possible, e.g. In case of a loss of external power supply, loss of coolant from reactor vessel or damage of steam or feed water pipeline. The system consists of the following components:
• The Passive Residual Heat Removal Heat Exchanger (PRHR HS), directly connected to the core coolant system, built using a set of 689 cylindrical channels with a diameter of 0.019 each. In case of a failure, the whole system creates a natural circulation loop which enables flow of coolant between the core and the exchanger. The exchanger, together with the coolant system, is isolated from the primary circuit by valves which only open in emergency. Exchanger channels, responsible for the heat transfer, are immersed in the In-containment Refuelling Water Storage Tank (IRWST), and the exchanger itself is located above the reactor cooling system. This configuration enables natural circulation of water, driven by a difference of water temperatures between the reactor vessel and IRWST [1, 2].
• In-containment Refuelling Water Storage tank -IRWST, with a capacity of 2100 m³, located above the reactor vessel, which is at the same time a part of the emergency core cooling system and a passive residual heat removal system. The tank is connected to the reactor's primary coolant circuit with two pipelines, and in case of coolant circulation damage or a sudden loss of coolant pressure, the water flows down driven by gravity. Moreover, the tank also acts as a heat sink for a passive heat exchanger [1, 2] . A diagram of the passive residual heat removal system is shown in Fig. 1 .
Operation of the passive heat removal system may be divided into several general stages. At first, in case of an accident, natural circulation establishes between the reactor vessel and the passive heat exchanger (PRHR HX). Then the heat from exchanger is transferred to the water contained in the refuelling water storage tank (IRWST); after some time the water starts to boil. IRWST is an open pool, therefore steam is collecting inside the containment. Steel containment, which is an integral part of the passive containment cooling system, is cooled from the outside with ambient air. Thanks to this solution it is itself a heat exchanger with a huge heat transfer area; it removes heat from the steam and causes it to condense. The condensate is then flowing by channels back to the IRWST, while the hot air is discharged back to the environment.
Analysis of the passive residual heat removal system in case of a loss of power supply
This chapter presents results of an analysis of passive residual heat removal system operation in case of loss of both off-site power and Diesel generators. In case of loss of off-site power, absence of a signal confirming Diesel generator start-up initiates a shutdown of the nuclear power unit. Emergency control rods, made of strong neutron absorbers, slide into the core, breaking the fission reactions. Yet due to nuclear processes occurring in fission products contained in the core, heat continues to be generated in the reactor; this is so-called residual heat, which needs to be removed. For approximately 2 minutes [1] the coolant circulation in the primary circuit is maintained thanks to the specially designed flywheel installed at the circulation pump. During that time the residual heat is transferred to the water contained in the steam generator. After some 2 minutes, water level in the steam generator reaches the minimum value, upon which the automation system triggers valves of the passive residual heat removal system. Thanks to the natural circulation, residual heat is transferred from the reactor core to the passive heat exchanger (PRHR HX), and then to the refuelling water storage tank (IRWST). Circulation is driven by the temperature/density difference between the cold reactor coolant in the passive heat exchanger (PRHR HX), and the hot fuel contained in the reactor core. Residual heat generated in the reactor 2 minutes after loss of power supply may be described with a following relation [3] :
(1) where:
-residual decay heat -reactor power before the shut-down -time since reactor shut-down -time between reactor start-up and shut-down . Assuming that prior to the emergency the reactor had been operated without major interruptions, it may be assumed that , and therefore the relation may be simplified to: . Heat transfer at the PRHR HX exchanger may be split into three stages: heat transfer from the fluid into the exchanger wall, heat conduction across the wall, and heat transfer to the heated medium. Therefore, the heat flux transferred at the PRHR HX exchanger may be determined as follows [6] . Adding the equations listed above yields the following relation describing the heat flux transferred from n tubular elements within the exchanger. (6) where:
-length of the PRHR HX exchanger -water temperature at the exchanger inlet , -water temperature at the IRWST -inner wall radius , -outer wall radius -thermal conductivity for the wall -heat transfer coefficient for the inner face -heat transfer coefficient for the outer face .
For flows in straight, cylindrical channels, at Reynolds number (Re) between 10,000 and 120,000 (turbulent flows) and at Prandtl number (Pr) between 0.7 and 120, the heat transfer coefficient may be calculated using the following relation [4] :
For the considered case, both Reynolds and Prandtl number values are within the ranges discussed above. Knowing the thermal power transferred to the IRWST, it is possible to calculate the outlet temperature of the water after the PHRH HX exchanger, using following relation [6] :
Results obtained in computations based on the heat transfer model discussed above are presented in the charts below. Fig. 3 presents reduction of the residual heat and residual heat transfer at the PHRH HX exchanger as functions of time. As it could be expected, both the residual heat generation and heat transfer at the exchanger diminish over time. Theoretically, the curves presented in the Fig. 3 should be coincident; this may demonstrate certain inaccuracies of the created model. On the other hand, differences during the initial phase, most significant for the safety, are relatively small (3-4%). 4 shows relations between the time and the working fluid temperature at the inlet/outlet of the PHRH HX exchanger (reactor outlet/inlet), and the temperature in the IRWST tank. It can be seen, that the PHRH inlet temperature drops considerably during the initial stage. This is due to both initial, lowest IRWST temperature, which guarantees more effective heat transfer, and rapid reduction of residual heat generation in the reactor. Very rapid reaction of the PHRH exchanger inlet temperature also causes a small reduction of the working medium temperature at the reactor inlet during the first phase. This situation of course is only temporary, and already from the 7 th minute core inlet temperature growth is observed. It can be seen that the temperature of the IRWST water grows steadily from the initial value up to 100°C, whereupon water boiling occurs. Steam generated in this process is contained inside the containment and gradually heats it up. In a nuclear power station with the AP1000 reactor, the containment consists of a steel pressure vessel, which is continuously cooled with a flow of air supplied from the atmosphere via inlet ducts (Fig. 5) . The air circulates naturally, recovering heat from the containment and through this causing steam condensation. Condensed steam falls under gravity to specially designed gutters, which direct it back to the IRWST. Basing on this system it was assumed that the volume of water in the IRWST pool is constant in time. Basing on the performed analysis it may be noted that water boiling at the IRWST occurred some 4.4 hours after the loss of power supply. From that moment, certain small reduction of both PHRH HX inlet and outlet temperatures can be observed. Upon the results presented in Tab. 1 it may be observed, that increasing IRWST initial water temperature obviously leads to shorter time after which boiling occurs, but also to higher maximum temperature at the core cooling circuit. Maximum permissible temperature at which PHRH HX exchanger may operate is 343.30°C [5] , therefore the initial IRWST water temperature should not exceed 45°C.
Conclusions
The purpose of the model created for this paper was analysing possibilities of residual heat removal in a nuclear power station with the AP1000 reactor, using the passive residual heat removal system. Basing on the relation (2) and the data provided by the reactor vendor -Westinghouse company [1], distribution of residual heat over time was created. Parameters describing the passive heat removal system were used to determine not only the thermal power recovered by the coolant in the reactor core, but also working medium temperatures at the reactor inlet and outlet, and the temperature in the refuelling water storage tank (IRWST), which acts as the heat sink for the heat generated in the core. Fig. 3 leads to a conclusion that certain simplifications introduced in the developed model lead to discrepancies between the residual heat generation and heat transfer into IRWST at the PHRH HX. As is shown in Fig. 3 , initially the differences are insignificant (3-4%), but they keep growing until the time of ca. 3600 s, when the difference between the residual heat generation and heat recovery at the IRWST reaches some 12.45%. After that time the difference reduces and at the end is around 10.50%. The model took into account changes of density and specific heat of the coolant as functions of temperature and pressure, but for the sake of simplicity constant flow value was assumed, which directly affects accuracy at this point. It is obvious, that as the temperature difference between the reactor and water tank diminishes, mass flow of water will also be reduced. Preliminary tests have demonstrated that reduction of the flow value in time considerably reduces differences shown in Fig. 3 . The next research step will involve defining the mass flow as a function of temperature difference between the heat source and heat sink, and improvement of the created model. Nonetheless, despite certain simplifications it was successfully demonstrated that the recovery of residual heat from the core in case of loss of off-site power and no power supply from Diesel generators is possible without any operator intervention. It is worth pointing out, that the passive residual heat removal system and the passive containment cooling system are based on natural phenomena based on fundamental laws of nature, which require practically no intervention, especially at the first moments after the emergency occurs. Fig. 4 presents the relations between the working medium temperature at different points of the cooling circuit and IRWST water temperature on one hand, and time on the other, as discussed above. As it has already been mentioned, rapid drop of the PHRH HX water inlet temperature at the early stage is attributable to the quickly diminishing residual heat generation, as well as the low heat sink temperature. Of course, due to the continuous growth of IRWST temperature, conditions for heat recovery from the coolant are gradually deteriorated, and after some 1.85 hours certain subtle growth of the reactor inlet water temperature may be observed. After onset of boiling at the IRWST, at some 4.41 hours, again certain small drop of water temperature at both reactor inlet and outlet, which persists until the end of the analysis, may be observed. From that moment onwards, heat transferred to the IRWST is fully used for evaporation of water contained in the tank. Some 36 hours after the onset of emergency, the reactor reaches a safe shut-down condition with no need for human intervention. After that time thermal power generated at the reactor does not exceed 0.6% of the nominal power rating.
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Streszczenie
Autorzy przedstawiają zasadę działania pasywnych systemów bezpieczeństwa stosowanych w elektrowniach jądrowych na przykładzie elektrowni z reaktorem AP1000. W szczególności opisują pasywny układ odprowadzania ciepła powyłączeniowego oraz pasywny system chłodzenia obudowy bezpieczeństwa. Ponadto w artykule zaprezentowano analizę scenariusza zakładającego niezałączenie się elementów systemów aktywnych (generatory Diesla) w przypadku awarii polegającej na utracie zasilania zewnętrz-nego. W pracy przedstawiono rolę wyżej wymienionych systemów pasywnych w odbiorze ciepła powyłączeniowego oraz ich wpływ na temperaturę czynnika roboczego w obiegu chłodzenia oraz w basenie magazynowym wody przeładunkowej (IRWST). Działanie pasywnego układu odprowadzania ciepła można podzielić na kilka podstawowych etapów. Najpierw w razie wystąpienia awarii następuje naturalna cyrkulacja ciepła pomiędzy zbiornikiem reaktora a pasywnym wymiennikiem ciepła (PRHR HX). Następnie ciepło z wymiennika odbierane jest przez wodę zgromadzoną w basenie magazynowym wody przeładunkowej (IRWST), która po pewnym czasie zaczyna wrzeć. Zbiornik IRWST jest otwarty, w związku z tym powstała para gromadzi się wewnątrz obudowy bezpieczeństwa. Wykonana ze stali obudowa, będąca integralną częścią pasywnego systemu chłodzenia obudowy bezpieczeń-stwa, chłodzona jest z zewnątrz powietrzem atmosferycznym. Dzięki takiemu rozwiązaniu stanowi ona wymiennik ciepła o ogromnej powierzchni, odbierając przy tym ciepło od pary i doprowadzając do jej skroplenia. Tak skroplona woda trafia z powrotem kanałami do zbiornika IRWTS, natomiast gorące powietrze kierowane jest ponownie do otoczenia.
2. Analiza pasywnego układu odprowadzania ciepła powyłączeniowego w przypadku utraty zasilania elektrycznego W poniższym rozdziale przedstawiono wyniki przeprowadzonej analizy działania pasywnego układu odprowadzania ciepła powyłączeniowego w przypadku utraty zarówno zasilania zewnętrznego, jak i generatorów Diesla. W przypadku utraty zasilania zewnętrznego brak sygnału potwierdzają-cego zadziałanie generatorów Diesla inicjuje proces wyłączenia bloku jądrowego. Pręty awaryjne, wykonane z materiałów silnie pochłaniających neutrony, zostają wprowadzone do rdzenia reaktora, natychmiastowo zatrzymując reakcje jądrowe rozszczepienia. Jednak w wyniku przemian jądrowych, zachodzących w produktach rozszczepienia znajdujących się w rdzeniu, w reaktorze nadal generowane jest ciepło, tzw. ciepło powyłączeniowe, które musi zostać odebrane. Przez ok. 2 minuty [1] obieg chło-dziwa w obiegu pierwotnym jest możliwy dzięki zastosowaniu specjalnie zaprojektowanego koła zamachowego w pompie cyrkulacyjnej. Przez ten czas ciepło powyłą-czeniowe oddawane jest wodzie znajdującej się w wytwornicy pary. Po ok. 2 minutach poziom wody w wytwornicy pary osiąga
